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Abstract
This Comment argues that, based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)’s purpose and legislative
history, prisoners who fulfilled the statute’s payment obligations while incarcerated should be entitled to apply
for traditional in forma pauperis (IFP) status under § 1915(a)(1) upon release. Part I traces the historical
development of prisoners’ right of access to the courts and its ties to the IFP doctrine. It then examines the
PLRA’s many amendments to the federal IFP statute. Part II explains the divergent readings that circuit courts
currently apply to § 1915(b). After analyzing the statute’s plain language and legislative history, Part III
concludes that Congress sought to impose the filing fee requirement on prisoners because they encounter
fewer financial and logistical obstacles throughout the litigation process, a justification that cannot extend to
released inmates. Finally, Part IV recommends that courts decide the continuing application of the PLRA on a
case-by-case basis that first takes into account a released prisoner’s prior compliance with the payment
formula, a solution that upholds both the prisoner’s constitutional right of access and the countervailing
government interests.
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INTRODUCTION 
A prisoner wants to file a lawsuit in federal court.  After drafting a 
complaint, he learns he has two options:  pay the entire $350 filing 
fee up front, or submit to an alternative arrangement whereby prison 
officials will debit smaller monthly payments from his commissary 
account.  Unable to afford the entire fee at the start of proceedings, 
he chooses the second option and files a poverty affidavit with the 
court.  Each month thereafter, as he earns wages for work performed 
in the prison facility, an administrator forwards payment from his 
account to the court clerk.  Several months later, while still making 
payments, he is released from prison.  His inmate account no longer 
exists, but he wants to continue his lawsuit.  He has not yet paid off 
the filing fee.  What should happen next?  Should he have to pay the 
balance immediately?  Should it be waived entirely?  The answer 
remains unclear. 
The federal circuits have adopted varied interpretations of  
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (PLRA)1 that defines a prisoner’s payment obligations when 
initiating a civil lawsuit or filing an appeal.  In an attempt to prevent 
abuse of the federal judicial system,2 the PLRA eliminated state 
funding for prisoner lawsuits.3  Previously, indigent prisoners could 
                                                          
 1. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).  Passed as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated 
Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, the 
PLRA became law on April 26, 1996.  See generally Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1558–59 (2003) (recounting the statute’s proposal and 
passage). 
 2. See infra Part III.B.1 (summarizing the high incidence of frivolous prisoner 
lawsuits in federal courts).  
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006) (mandating that all prisoners, even 
impoverished ones, pay the full filing fee when commencing an action in district 
court). 
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apply for traditional in forma pauperis (IFP) status, which provides for 
a waiver of the filing fee and certain other court-imposed costs.4  
Under the PLRA, however, all prisoners must now pay the full 
amount of the filing fee, regardless of their eligibility for a waiver.5  
Thirteen years after the PLRA’s passage, the circuits have yet to agree 
on how this requirement applies to prisoners who are released after 
filing their complaint or notice of appeal but before completing 
payment under the installment plan outlined in § 1915(b)(1)–(2).6  
The confusion lies in the statute’s mandate that payment be debited 
over time from a prisoner’s institutional account.7  Section 
1915(b)(2) contemplates no other methods of payment and 
therefore fails to explain how prisoners can satisfy the filing fee after 
being released.  
Faced with this issue soon after the statute’s enactment, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit opted not to apply the 
PLRA’s payment requirements to prisoners released during the 
pendency of their suit.8  Concerned that an alternative holding would 
require prisoners to pay a large lump sum immediately upon release, 
the court ruled to waive any remaining balance of the filing fee under 
                                                          
 4. See infra Part I.B (discussing the origin and purpose of the IFP doctrine).   
For purposes of this Comment, “traditional IFP status” refers to a waiver of the filing 
fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the provision of the United States Code 
predating and postdating the PLRA that regulates IFP procedures for non-prisoner 
litigants. 
 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (replacing the waiver system with a repayment 
plan for prisoners bringing civil actions). 
 6. See infra Part II (documenting the courts’ conflicting views of a released 
prisoner’s continuing payment obligations under the PLRA).  Courts have uniformly 
agreed that the PLRA does not affect former prisoners who file a lawsuit after 
release.  See, e.g., Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
PLRA did not apply to an inmate who filed a civil rights action after he was released 
on parole); see also Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1641 (“[T]he PLRA’s provisions 
generally apply only to nonhabeas civil actions ‘brought’ by ‘prisoners’—that is, not 
by former inmates or by inmates’ families or estates.”). 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (instructing courts to collect the filing fee 
from funds in the prisoner’s commissary account).  Since 1930, the Department of 
Justice has created individual “bank type accounts” for federal inmates so that they 
can purchase items at the prison commissary, which stocks food and other goods.  
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Money, http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/ 
money.jsp (last visited July 29, 2009).  These accounts enable prison administrators 
to “maintain inmates’ monies” during their incarceration.  Id.  Each facility records 
prisoners’ account transactions, including purchases at the commissary and deposits 
of wages earned from prison labor.  Id.  Inmates typically earn twelve to forty cents 
per hour for maintenance work performed at their prison facility.  Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, Work Programs, http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/work_prgms.jsp 
(last visited July 29, 2009).  In addition, approximately eighteen percent of inmates 
participate in the Federal Prison Industries (FPI) program and earn between 
twenty-three cents and one dollar per hour while manufacturing metals, furniture, 
electronics, and textiles.  Id.  
 8. See infra Part II.A (describing the Second Circuit’s analysis of a released 
prisoner’s payment obligations under the PLRA). 
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).9  The United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits later adopted similar holdings.10   
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and 
District of Columbia Circuits, on the other hand, relied on what they 
characterized as a plain reading of § 1915(b) to hold that the PLRA’s 
payment mandate continues to apply after a prisoner’s release from 
custody.11  In these jurisdictions, despite shedding prisoner status 
upon release, the litigant does not shed the obligation to pay the full 
filing fee.12  Thus, released prisoners find themselves caught 
somewhere between the jailhouse and courthouse doors, even 
though they are no longer under the care of the state and must 
assume the same financial responsibilities as non-prisoners.13 
This Comment argues that, based on the PLRA’s purpose and 
legislative history, prisoners who fulfilled the statute’s payment 
obligations while incarcerated should be entitled to apply for 
traditional IFP status under § 1915(a)(1) upon release.  Part I traces 
the historical development of prisoners’ right of access to the courts 
and its ties to the IFP doctrine.  It then examines the PLRA’s many 
amendments to the federal IFP statute.  Part II explains the divergent 
readings that circuit courts currently apply to § 1915(b).  After 
analyzing the statute’s plain language and legislative history, Part III 
concludes that Congress sought to impose the filing fee requirement 
on prisoners because they encounter fewer financial and logistical 
obstacles throughout the litigation process, a justification that cannot 
extend to released inmates.  Finally, Part IV recommends that courts 
decide the continuing application of the PLRA on a case-by-case basis 
that first takes into account a released prisoner’s prior compliance 
with the payment formula, a solution that upholds both the 
prisoner’s constitutional right of access and the countervailing 
government interests.   
                                                          
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See infra Part II.B (explaining that these circuits consider a prisoner’s 
payment obligations under § 1915(b) to attach at the time of filing, making his 
subsequent release irrelevant).   
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part III.B (comparing the litigation and living expenses incurred by 
prisoners and non-prisoners). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Constitutional Right of Access to the Courts 
The Supreme Court granted new rights to prisoners in a series of 
historic cases beginning in 1940.14  First, Ex parte Hull15 established the 
right of inmates to file petitions in federal court to challenge the 
legality and conditions of their confinement.16  Despite this ruling, 
many courts still hesitated to interfere with the practices of prison 
administrators.17  Several years later in Cooper v. Pate,18 however, the 
Supreme Court signaled the end of this “hands-off” policy by 
authorizing state inmates to seek damages for civil rights violations in 
federal court.19   
In 1969, Johnson v. Avery20 reaffirmed and extended inmates’ right 
of access to the courts by invalidating a Tennessee regulation that 
prohibited prisoners from providing legal advice or services to one 
another.21  The Court reasoned that the rule effectively forbade 
                                                          
 14. See Jennifer Winslow, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical 
Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits:  Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655, 
1678 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court, in the sixty years prior to the passage of the 
PLRA, gradually built up the cadre of civil rights afforded to inmates in the nations’ 
prisons.”).  See generally JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS  
145–47 (8th ed. 2006) (tracing the history of prisoner access to the federal court 
system). 
 15. 312 U.S. 546 (1941). 
 16. See id. at 642 (invalidating a state prison regulation that required a prisoner 
to submit all legal documents to a prison official for examination and censorship 
before he filed them with the court on the ground that “the state and its officers may 
not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of 
habeas corpus”). 
 17. See United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1956) 
(“[I]t is well settled that it is not the function of the courts to superintend the 
treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries . . . .” (quoting Stroud v. 
Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1951))); United States ex rel. Palmer v. Ragen, 
159 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1947) (“Under repeated decisions, state governmental 
bodies, who are charged with prosecution and punishment of offenders, are not to 
be interfered with except in case of extraordinary circumstances.” (quoting Davis v. 
Dowd, 119 F.2d 338, 338 (7th Cir. 1941))); TODD R. CLEAR ET AL., AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS 101 (7th ed. 2006) (commenting that courts maintained a “hands-off” 
policy with respect to corrections and refused to set standards for the treatment of 
prisoners by claiming that they lacked the authority and the expertise to do so). 
 18. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). 
 19. See id. at 546 (granting state prison inmates standing to sue in federal court to 
address their grievances under the Civil Rights Act of 1871); see also 1 MICHAEL B. 
MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.03 (2d ed. 1993) (describing a variety of 
developments in the federal judiciary and the American political system that 
combined “to shake the foundations” of the hands-off doctrine in the 1960s).  
 20. 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
 21. See id. at 490 (“[U]nless and until the State provides some reasonable 
alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, 
it may not validly enforce a regulation . . . barring inmates from furnishing such 
assistance to other prisoners.”). 
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illiterate and non-English-speaking prisoners from filing habeas 
corpus petitions because they were incapable of drafting petitions 
without the aid of other inmates.22  Eight years later, the Supreme 
Court broadened prisoner access even further in Bounds v. Smith,23 a 
landmark case in which the Court imposed an affirmative duty on 
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 
legal documents by providing adequate law libraries or adequate 
assistance from persons trained in the law.24  In essence, the decision 
required that prisoners receive “a reasonably adequate opportunity to 
present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the 
courts.”25  The Court explained that states could fulfill this obligation 
by providing items such as paper, writing utensils, notary services, 
stamps, funds to pay for transcripts, and court-appointed attorneys.26  
At different times since the inception of the right to court access, 
the Supreme Court has identified its source as the Due Process 
Clause,27 the Equal Protection Clause,28 and the First Amendment.29  
In recent years, the circuit courts have upheld restrictions on the 
availability of legal resources in prisons in order to maintain security 
and internal order,30 prevent the introduction of contraband,31 and 
                                                          
 22. See id. at 487 (finding that the statute amounted to a denial of access to the 
courts). 
 23. 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 24. See id. at 822 (mandating that prisoners receive “adequate, effective, and 
meaningful” access). 
 25. Id. at 825.   
 26. Id. at 824–25.  Several decades later, the Court refuted the idea that prisoners 
have an absolute right to adequate prison libraries or legal services in Lewis v. Casey, 
518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996).  According to the majority in Lewis, Bounds “guarantees no 
particular methodology” but rather the more general right of access to the courts.  
Id.  Nevertheless, even under this more restrictive interpretation, prisoners still retain 
a fundamental right to access the courts to pursue direct appeals from the 
convictions for which they are incarcerated, to present habeas corpus petitions, and 
to bring actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge conditions of their 
confinement.  Id. at 354–55.   
 27. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (“The right of access to 
the courts . . . is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will 
be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning 
violations of fundamental constitutional rights.”), overruled on other grounds by Sandin 
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
 28. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (referencing the 
“equal protection guarantee of ‘meaningful access’” to the courts). 
 29. See, e.g., Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (describing 
the right of access to the courts as “an aspect of the First Amendment right to 
petition the Government for redress of grievances”). 
 30. See Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 606 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that 
legitimate security concerns during a post-riot lockdown that resulted in the death of 
an inmate and two guards justified temporary restrictions on inmates’ access to 
library materials). 
 31. See Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 608–10 (6th Cir. 1993) (authorizing 
prison officials to open and inspect packages from inmates’ attorneys).  
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manage budgetary needs.32  Nevertheless, in the absence of such 
administrative concerns, courts continue to recognize prisoners’ right 
of access as a fundamental constitutional entitlement.33  To overcome 
the financial obstacles that would otherwise prevent them from 
exercising this right, most prisoners petition for IFP status when filing 
suit.34 
B. IFP Proceedings in Federal Courts Before the PLRA 
To commence a civil lawsuit in federal district court, the initiating 
party must prepay a filing fee.35  Although the Constitution does not 
guarantee free access to the courts in all cases,36 prior to 1996 almost 
all courts had a statutory or administrative procedure excusing the 
payment of judicial costs and fees for any indigent litigant, including 
prisoners.37  
                                                          
 32. See Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1308 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that prison 
authorities may reasonably attempt to limit inmates’ use of the mail system in light of 
budgetary cutbacks). 
 33. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) (“Because a prisoner 
ordinarily is divested of the privilege to vote, the right to file a court action might be 
said to be his remaining most ‘fundamental political right, because [sic] preservative 
of all rights.’” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886))); Beville v. 
Ednie, 74 F.3d 210, 212 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A prison inmate’s right of access to the 
courts is the most fundamental right he or she holds.” (quoting DeMallory v. Cullen, 
855 F.2d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 1988))); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 
1973) (“[A]n inmate’s right of unfettered access to the courts is as fundamental a 
right as any other he may hold. . . . All other rights of an inmate are illusory without 
it, being entirely dependent for their existence on the whim or caprice of the prison 
warden.”).  
 34. See Jody L. Sturtz, Comment, A Prisoner’s Privilege to File In forma pauperis 
Proceedings:  May It Be Numerically Restricted?, 1995 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 
1349, 1351 (1995) (“Since a vast majority of inmates are indigent, the constitutional 
right to access would be meaningless without the In forma pauperis Statute.”).   
 35. Parties instituting a civil action in federal district court must pay a filing fee of 
$350.  28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006).  To appeal a judgment of the district court, 
appellants must prepay a filing fee of $450.  28 U.S.C. § 1913 (2006).  
 36. The Supreme Court has mandated waivers of filing fees in civil cases only 
where the litigant has a fundamental interest at stake.  Compare Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–83 (1971) (invalidating a Connecticut statute that 
required payment of pretrial fees as a condition precedent to initiating a divorce 
proceeding), and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124–28 (1996) (classifying the right 
to maintain ties with one’s children as fundamental and holding that Mississippi state 
courts could not impose fees that prevented indigent parents from obtaining 
appellate review of a judicial termination of their guardianship rights), with United 
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (refusing to recognize a fundamental right of 
access for the purpose of obtaining a discharge of one’s debts in bankruptcy and 
declining to adopt “an unlimited rule that an indigent at all times and in all cases has 
the right to relief without the payment of fees”).  The types of fundamental interests 
that can trigger IFP assistance extend beyond the family context.  See supra note 33 
and accompanying text (noting that courts have recognized prisoners’ fundamental 
interest in being able to vindicate their constitutional rights through litigation).  
 37. For example, state legislatures enacted statutes to facilitate court access 
“[e]arly in this country’s history.”  Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts:  
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Congress passed the original federal IFP statute in 1892, thereby 
giving courts the discretionary power to permit indigent plaintiffs to 
initiate civil actions without first paying a filing fee.38  By enacting the 
statute, Congress sought “to guarantee that no citizen [would] be 
denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action, 
civil or criminal, ‘in any court of the United States’ solely because his 
poverty [made] it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs.”39  
Until the PLRA, subsequent versions of this statute allowed qualifying 
indigent litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, to bypass the 
filing fee when bringing a civil suit.40  No repayment provision 
existed, and federal courts could bestow the IFP designation on any 
litigant who, in good faith, filed a poverty affidavit and demonstrated 
an inability to pay fees.41  
When applying the IFP statute, courts have attempted to balance 
the interest of the state in collecting fees with the interest of indigent 
citizens in presenting their grievances.42  IFP status has never been 
                                                          
The In Forma Pauperis Statute—Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413, 413 
(1985).   
 38. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252, 252 (current version at  
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006)).  
 39. Adkins v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948).  
Congress desired that the government not prohibit indigent citizens from litigating a 
case “because they happen to be without the money to advance pay to the tribunals 
of justice.”  Feldman, supra note 37, at 413–14 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 52-1079, at 2 
(1892)). 
 40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994) (amended 1996) (“Any court of the United 
States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action 
or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and 
costs or security therefor . . . .”).  
 41. See id. (requiring IFP applicants to submit an affidavit that described their 
assets, liabilities, and employment opportunities and stated the nature of the action).  
In an effort to prevent fraud, courts required the supporting affidavit to state facts 
concerning the plaintiff’s poverty with some level of “particularity, definiteness, and 
certainty.”  Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960) (per curiam).  
Courts also retained the authority to deny IFP status if a plaintiff deliberately failed to 
report available assets.  See, e.g., Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 
517–19 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming the lower court’s denial of IFP status because it 
appeared that the applicant had access to an unknown amount of money either 
through his family, his extortion activities, or his legal work on behalf of fellow 
inmates).  But see Acevedo v. Reid, 653 F. Supp. 347, 348–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(excusing an inmate’s failure to report his veterans’ benefits and prison salary on his 
application for IFP status where (1) there was no evidence that he had acted in bad 
faith, and (2) he would have been eligible for IFP status even if those assets were 
taken into account).  Similarly, courts could deny IFP status if they found that an 
applicant had intentionally depleted his resources in order to qualify for a fee waiver.  
See, e.g.,  Collier v. Tatum, 722 F.2d 653, 655 (11th Cir. 1983) (authorizing the lower 
court to examine the plaintiff’s financial dealings during the time period 
immediately preceding the filing of the suit to determine whether he had 
intentionally shifted or wasted assets that he otherwise could have used to finance the 
action).   
 42. Compare Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam) 
(upholding a filing fee requirement in Oregon in part because it helped the state 
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recognized as a constitutional right; rather, courts characterize it as a 
congressionally created benefit that can be extended or limited by 
the legislature.43  At the same time, federal courts have never required 
that a litigant be absolutely destitute to qualify for IFP assistance.44  
For example, an applicant made a sufficient showing of poverty to 
proceed IFP by testifying that she had been unemployed for two 
years, received $163 per month in Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) benefits and a $385 housing subsidy, had no cash 
or savings account, and resided with her fourteen-year-old daughter.45 
Recognizing that IFP litigants lack an economic deterrent from 
filing meritless complaints, Congress previously enabled federal 
courts to dismiss frivolous or malicious lawsuits in an effort to prevent 
potential abuse of § 1915.46  Despite that provision, prisoners 
increasingly exploited the statute to file repetitive and often frivolous 
lawsuits against prison officials at the states’ expense.47  Eventually, in 
                                                          
court system offset some of its operating costs), with Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339 (holding 
that the ability to pay does not require that plaintiffs contribute “the last dollar they 
have or can get, and thus make themselves and their dependents wholly destitute”).   
 43. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (“[T]he 
expenditure of public funds [on behalf of an indigent litigant] is proper only when 
authorized by Congress . . . .”).   
 44. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 893 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“An affidavit 
to proceed in forma pauperis is sufficient if it states that one cannot, because of 
poverty, afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still provide for him or herself 
and any dependents.” (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339)). 
 45. Tatum v. Cmty. Bank, 866 F. Supp. 988, 994 (E.D. Tex. 1994).  Some 
decisions in the last several decades have sought to limit the scope of the federal IFP 
statute by distinguishing between direct and indirect barriers to court access.   
See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 112 F.R.D. 183, 185 (1986) (holding that 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1915 does not require the government to advance funds for deposition expenses 
because the statute only seeks to provide indigent parties with a reasonable 
opportunity to litigate their claims); Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 288–90  
(6th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that a state’s refusal to waive the costs of transcripts, 
expert witness fees, or fees to secure depositions does not deny or infringe on a 
person’s right of access to the courts because it does not totally bar him or her from 
bringing a case).  Thus, some courts waive only mandatory costs that affect a litigant’s 
ability to physically access the courtroom.  See, e.g., Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 
811 (5th Cir. 1989) (“In its most obvious and formal manifestation, the right [of 
access] protects one’s physical access to the courts.”); Johnson, 698 F.2d at 288–90 
(differentiating between actual access to the courts and procedures involved in the 
trial process such as depositions and transcripts).  See generally Robert F. Koets, 
Annotation, What Constitutes “Fees” or “Costs” Within Meaning of Federal Statutory 
Provision (28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 and Similar Predecessor Statutes) Permitting Party to Proceed 
In Forma Pauperis Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or Security Therefor, 142 A.L.R. 
FED. 627 (1998) (analyzing federal cases in which courts have determined whether 
particular expenses fall within the scope of the IFP statute). 
 46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994) (amended 1996) (giving courts discretionary 
power to dismiss an IFP proceeding “if satisfied that the action [was] frivolous or 
malicious”). 
 47. See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (lamenting that 
“[m]any prisoners filing lawsuits today in Federal court claim indigent status” and 
that they therefore experience “no economic disincentive to going to court”).  
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response to remarkably high filing rates in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Congress resolved to completely transform the IFP program.48  
C. The Amended Language of the Federal IFP Statute 
Introduced as an amendment to the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA),49 the PLRA modified and 
supplemented the U.S. Code in a number of ways to restrict prisoner 
litigation.50  It redesigned the statutory subsections of § 1915 so that 
all prisoners bringing a civil action, even indigent ones, must pay the 
full filing fee.51  The statute states in pertinent part: 
                                                          
 48. See infra Part III.B.1 (documenting the statistical and anecdotal evidence of 
prisoner filing rates that prompted passage of the PLRA). 
 49. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1997 (2006)).  The CRIPA provides a statutory basis for the United States Attorney 
General to conduct litigation on behalf of institutionalized citizens.  See id.  
§ 1997a(a).  Congress enacted the statute in 1980 in response to alleged 
constitutional rights violations in “prisons, jails, mental health facilities, and other 
[confinement] institutions throughout the country.”  Lynn S. Branham, The Prison 
Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement:  What It Means and What 
Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 
493 (2001). 
 50. Specifically, the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all administrative 
remedies before filing suit, places strict limitations on attorneys’ fees, precludes 
compensatory damage awards for mental or emotional injuries, and allows for 
revocation of prisoners’ good time credits in certain instances.  See Schlanger, supra 
note 1, at 1627–32 (discussing the statute’s new procedural mandates and limitations 
on recovery).  Many commentators have criticized the statute for the restrictions it 
places on prisoners’ ability to challenge conditions of their confinement in court.   
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act:   
The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1779 (2003) (“[T]he PLRA 
met a predominantly hostile academic reaction and a large number of court 
challenges.”).  In February 2007, the American Bar Association’s general policy-
making body passed a resolution urging Congress to repeal or amend certain 
sections of the PLRA.  See ROBERT M.A. JOHNSON, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT 
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2007), http://www.savecoalition.org/ 
americanbar.html (listing proposed amendments and contending that Congress 
never fully vetted the statute’s implications).  Despite these criticisms, however,  
“the statute has survived judicial scrutiny essentially unchanged.”  Roosevelt, supra, at 
1778. 
 51. See Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. State Jail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(“Under the PLRA, a prisoner is not entitled to commence an action or file an 
appeal without prepayment in some form (§ 1915(b)(2)), a privilege afforded to 
non-prisoners under § 1915(a)(1).”); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 
(6th Cir. 1997) (“Pauper status for inmates, as we previously knew it, no longer 
exists.”).  Courts had begun to condition IFP status on payment of a partial filing fee, 
calculated in accordance with various formulas, even prior to the passage of the 
PLRA.  See In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1989) (remarking that a district 
court’s power to waive the entire filing fee includes the power to waive only a portion 
of it); Lumbert v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.2d 257, 260 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming the 
dismissal of an inmate’s civil rights suit when he failed to pay a $7.20 partial filing 
fee); Smith v. Martinez, 706 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1983) (ruling that the district 
court had discretion to require an indigent prisoner to pay at least minimal service 
and filing fees where data of his present assets showed that he could do so without 
undue financial hardship); Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 1981) 
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[I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma 
pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a 
filing fee.  The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a 
partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial 
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (A) the average monthly 
deposits to the prisoner’s account; or (B) the average monthly 
balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period 
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of 
appeal.52  
The statute further provides: 
After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be 
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding 
month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.  The agency 
having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the 
prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount 
in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.53  
Thus, inmates must either pay the entire filing fee at the initiation 
of the proceeding or apply for revised IFP status and proceed under 
the strict installment plan set forth in § 1915(b)(1)–(2).  The latter 
option requires an inmate to pay an initial partial filing fee from 
funds in his inmate account.54 Once he pays the initial partial filing 
fee in full, the prisoner must make installment payments equal to 
twenty percent of his preceding month’s income, as long as that 
amount exceeds ten dollars.55  For example, if a prisoner maintains 
an average monthly account balance of twenty dollars for the six 
months preceding the filing of his complaint, he would have to pay 
twenty percent of that amount, or four dollars, as an initial partial 
filing fee.  Thereafter, assuming that the prisoner continues to 
accumulate twenty dollars in his account each month, he would pay 
four-dollar installments for roughly eighty-eight months to satisfy the 
$350 filing fee. 
                                                          
(finding nothing impermissible in compelling a prisoner to make “some partial 
contribution” out of resources from his commissary account, accumulated either 
from earnings or private resources); In re Stump, 449 F.2d 1297, 1298 (1st Cir. 1971) 
(requiring a state prisoner who had a $218 cash credit with the prison warden to pay 
a $15 filing fee in a civil rights action arising out of his parole revocation).  
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006). 
 53. Id. § 1915(b)(2). 
 54. Id. § 1915(b)(1).  The amended statute requires prisoners to eventually pay 
the initial partial filing fee even if they lack financial resources at the time they file 
the complaint or appeal.  See id. (instructing courts to collect the initial partial filing 
fee “when funds exist”).  Therefore, if funds accumulate in a prisoner’s account at a 
later date, the prison administrator must immediately forward that money to the 
court, even if it amounts to less than ten dollars.  Id. 
 55. Id. § 1915(b)(2). 
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The PLRA also demands more detailed documentation of a 
prisoner’s indigent status than previous versions of the IFP statute 
demanded.56  In addition, courts can charge a prisoner who loses a 
case for the full costs related to the action.57  The process for a non-
incarcerated indigent litigant remains the same as before the PLRA’s 
enactment.58  Thus, if a non-prisoner moves for traditional IFP status 
under  
§ 1915(a)(1), the court can waive the filing fee as long as the litigant 
demonstrates a lack of financial resources.59  While trial courts retain 
broad discretion in assessing an IFP applicant’s indigency, the PLRA 
mandates dismissal upon a finding that the litigant falsified his 
poverty affidavit; the suit is frivolous or malicious; the complaint fails 
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or the litigant seeks 
monetary relief against a defendant who qualifies for immunity.60  
Courts handle the timing of the indigency and frivolity 
determinations differently.61 
                                                          
 56. See id. § 1915(a)(2) (requiring submission of “a certified copy of the trust 
fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month 
period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal, 
obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was 
confined”). 
 57. Id. § 1915(f)(2)(A).  Courts retain discretion to excuse the payment of costs.  
See, e.g., Culp v. Zaccagnino, No. 96 CIV 3280, 2000 WL 35861, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.  
Jan. 18, 2000) (declining to assess costs in the amount of $2,693.85 against a prisoner 
who had no checking accounts, stocks or bonds and had only $0.12 in his 
commissary account). 
 58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (“[A]ny court of the United States may authorize 
the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil 
or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a 
person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner 
possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.”).   
The section’s use of the phrase “statement of all assets such prisoner possesses” does 
not preclude non-prisoners from proceeding IFP in federal court but rather appears 
to be a typographical error by which Congress substituted “prisoner” for “person.”   
See Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275–76 (6th Cir. 1997) (reaching this 
conclusion in light of the statute’s purpose to curtail inmate litigation, the 
grammatical structure of the paragraph, and the general references to a “person” 
before and after the “prisoner” reference).  
 59. See supra Part I.B (describing the scope of the pre-PLRA IFP procedure). 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A)–(B).  
 61. In order to create an adequate record for appeal, most circuits conduct a 
two-step inquiry that begins with an examination of the applicant’s affidavit of 
poverty.  See, e.g., McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(remarking that under the PLRA courts must initially examine a prisoner’s financial 
status before considering the merits of his complaint), abrogated on other grounds by 
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).  If the court grants IFP status, it then evaluates 
the substance of the complaint.  Id. at 608.  In contrast, some courts review the 
petitioner’s IFP application while simultaneously deciding the merits of his claim.  
See, e.g., Carson v. Tulsa Police Dep’t, 266 Fed. App’x 763, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(declining to decide whether the PLRA’s payment requirements apply to a released 
prisoner and instead concluding that the plaintiff’s complaint was frivolous).   
Under this approach, the court automatically denies IFP status upon a finding that 
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Additionally, the PLRA neither defines “civil action” nor expressly 
excludes habeas corpus proceedings from its scope.62  However, most 
courts have determined that habeas corpus and other post-judgment 
proceedings challenging criminal convictions or sentences do not 
constitute civil actions for purposes of the PLRA.63  Courts have 
further reasoned that the PLRA’s provisions apply to mandamus and 
other extraordinary writs when the relief sought is similar to that in a 
civil action, but not when the writ concerns criminal matters.64  As a 
general rule, the PLRA’s fee requirements for a “civil action” apply 
primarily to cases where prisoners seek to challenge conditions of 
their confinement.65 
II. THE CONFLICT AMONG FEDERAL COURTS:   
DIVERGENT READINGS OF § 1915(b) 
Congress failed to articulate a payment procedure for litigants 
released after filing a complaint or notice of appeal, and, as a result, 
the circuits have had to decide whether released prisoners should be 
liable for the full amount of the filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1) in 
the same way as those who remain incarcerated.66  The Fifth, Seventh, 
                                                          
the claim is frivolous or malicious and thereby dismisses the case.  See, e.g., Carson, 
266 Fed. App’x at 767 (dismissing the plaintiff’s civil rights complaint without 
evaluating his eligibility for revised IFP status under the PLRA).  Courts utilize the 
one-step procedure in part because it “helps minimize the drain on public funds and 
judicial resources that in forma pauperis litigants might otherwise cause.”  Feldman, 
supra note 37, at 425. 
 62. See Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 63. See, e.g., Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying on 
other courts’ analyses of the legislative history of the PLRA, which “supports a clear 
line between civil actions attacking conditions of confinement (subject to the PLRA) 
and habeas corpus petitions attacking the fact or duration of confinement (subject to 
the rules governing habeas corpus)”). 
 64. Compare In re Jacobs, 213 F.3d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 2000) (characterizing a 
petition for mandamus as a civil action for purposes of the PLRA’s three strikes 
provision), and In re Crittenden, 143 F.3d 919, 920 (5th Cir. 1998) (barring a plaintiff 
with three dismissals from seeking a writ of mandamus without the payment of fees), 
with Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 855 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a 
petition for a writ of mandamus in a criminal proceeding is not a civil action for the 
purposes of § 1915(b)(1)).  
 65. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the 
PLRA applies to claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal 
Torts Claims Act, most of which concern prison conditions).   
 66. The question of § 1915’s applicability to released prisoners continually arises 
in the federal court system.  For example, courts in the Tenth Circuit have recently 
discussed the issue but dismissed relevant cases on other grounds.  See Carson, 266 
Fed. App’x at 766–67 (declining to decide the issue and dismissing the case as 
frivolous); Hobbs v. El Paso County, No. 07-00434, 2008 WL 2787246, at *4–5  
(D. Colo. July 16, 2008) (identifying the circuit split but dismissing the action due to 
the plaintiff’s failure to file court-ordered documents).  Courts have also differed 
over the application of other PLRA provisions to prisoners released after filing a 
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and D.C. Circuits have held that the obligation to pay the fee arises at 
the time of filing and continues upon release because of specific 
language in the first sentence of § 1915(b)(1), namely the term 
“prisoner” and the phrase “brings a civil action.”67   
The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, have 
reasoned that because the rest of § 1915(b)(1) and all of  
§ 1915(b)(2) refer exclusively to the litigant’s inmate account, the 
installment plan can only apply to those who remain incarcerated.68  
With no indication from Congress as to the proper mechanism by 
which to collect payment in this scenario, these circuits allow released 
prisoners to apply to proceed under the provision of the IFP statute 
applicable to non-prisoners:  § 1915(a)(1).69   
Thus, the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have focused their 
analyses on the inconsistencies in the installment plan, while the 
Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have ascribed greater importance to 
the mandate of § 1915(b)(1) that prisoners pay the full filing fee.70  
These decisions demonstrate the difficulty in trying to give indigent 
prisoners an adequate opportunity to litigate a case while also 
maintaining the integrity of the judicial system.  As discussed in  
Part IV, requiring former prisoners to meet all past due obligations 
                                                          
complaint or notice of appeal.  Compare Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 973–76  
(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that plaintiffs released after filing a lawsuit 
remain prisoners for purposes of the PLRA’s physical injury requirement), and 
Becker v. Vargo, No. 02-7380, 2004 WL 1068779, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 17, 2004) 
(holding that plaintiffs released after filing a lawsuit remain prisoners for purposes of 
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement), with Dennison v. Prison Health Serv.,  
No. 00-266, 2001 WL 761218, at *2–3 (D. Me. July 6, 2001) (holding the opposite 
with respect to the exhaustion requirement), and Murphy v. Magnusson, No. 98-439, 
1999 WL 615895, at *3 (D. Me. July 27, 1999) (holding that a former prisoner need 
not exhaust administrative remedies after his release from custody).  Unlike the 
physical injury and exhaustion requirements, which must be satisfied either before or 
at the time of filing, the IFP provision involves a continuing obligation.  Compare 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006) (precluding prisoners from filing federal civil actions “for 
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of 
physical injury”), and id. § 1997e(a) (requiring prisoners to exhaust all available 
administrative remedies before filing suit), with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (2006) 
(requiring inmates to pay the filing fee in installments over an indefinite period). 
 67. See, e.g., Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. State Jail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 
1997) (emphasizing the litigant’s incarceration status at the time he filed his appeal). 
 68. See McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(reasoning that the detailed mechanism Congress created for implementing the 
payment obligation—deductions from prison accounts—demonstrates that it 
expected the requirement to apply to a prisoner who remains incarcerated). 
 69. See id. at 30 (“A released prisoner may litigate without further prepayment of 
fees upon satisfying the poverty affidavit requirement applicable to all non-
prisoners.”). 
 70. Compare id. (suggesting the difficulties continuing fee obligations impose on 
indigent released prisoners), with Gay, 117 F.3d at 241 (describing the revised IFP 
procedure for prisoner-plaintiffs as a necessary “front-end deterrent” that came in 
response to a congressional desire to reduce frivolous filings in federal courts). 
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under the PLRA achieves the proper balance between these 
competing interests.   
A. The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits Have Authorized 
 § 1915(a)(1)’s Application to Released Prisoners 
Emphasizing the inconsistencies in § 1915(b)’s installment plan, 
the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have endorsed pre-PLRA IFP 
eligibility for released prisoners.  The Second Circuit first adopted 
this position in McGann v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration,71 
holding that a prisoner’s obligation to pay the remainder of the filing 
fee upon release depends solely on whether he qualifies for a 
traditional IFP waiver under § 1915(a)(1).72  McGann filed his 
complaint while he was a New York state prisoner and challenged a 
policy of the Social Security Administration denying certain benefits 
to inmates.73  On appeal, the court required that McGann either pay 
the required fees, move anew for leave to proceed IFP, or authorize 
his former prison to release his prison account information and debit 
the payments owed under the PLRA’s installment plan.74  Responding 
by letter, McGann contended that because he had been released 
from prison, he qualified for IFP status under § 1915(a)(1), as 
opposed to § 1915(b), and was therefore excused from complying 
with the PLRA’s requirements.75   
In considering whether McGann had a continued obligation to pay 
the filing fee, the court found that § 1915(b)(1)–(2) creates “a facial 
inconsistency” as applied to released prisoners.76  According to the 
court, the statute “broadly” states that “a prisoner who files an appeal 
‘shall be required’ to pay filing fees” but in the very next sentence 
mandates that the payment amounts be calculated as percentages of 
the balances of, or deposits into, the prisoner’s account.77  Because 
McGann was no longer a prisoner, there was no account from which 
to calculate and debit the required payments.78  The court reasoned 
that because the statute ties payment to the existence and amount of 
a prisoner’s commissary account, it could not apply the law without 
such an account.79  Thus, the court concluded that “a literal reading 
                                                          
 71. 96 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 72. Id. at 30.   
 73. Id. at 29.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 29–30. 
 79. Id.  
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of all provisions of the PLRA, as applied to released prisoners, [was] 
not possible.”80 
The Second Circuit then proposed that § 1915(b) means either 
that (1) if released, the prisoner must immediately pay the entire 
remaining amount of the filing fee; or (2) the prisoner must make 
the installment payments only while incarcerated, and that, upon his 
release, he can qualify for traditional IFP status under § 1915(a)(1).81  
The court ultimately selected the second construction because, 
although § 1915(b)(1) specifies that a prisoner “shall” pay the full 
filing fee, the detailed mechanism Congress created for 
implementing that obligation by debiting prison accounts 
demonstrated that it “expected the new payment requirement to 
apply to a prisoner who remains incarcerated.”82  According to the 
court, the alternative reading would mean that the litigant would 
have to pay the entire balance of the fee in a single payment upon 
release from prison, “a result that would be more onerous than that 
imposed on those who remain incarcerated.”83  
Later cases in the Second Circuit and other jurisdictions have 
construed this decision to mean that a prisoner’s release relieves him 
of any liability for the balance of the filing fee, regardless of whether 
he made all required payments under the installment scheme during 
his incarceration.84  Thus, under this rationale, a released prisoner 
may litigate without further payment of fees upon satisfying the 
poverty affidavit requirement applicable to all non-prisoners.85   
At least one court in the Eighth Circuit has adopted the McGann 
rationale in a decision regarding a prisoner’s continuing obligations 
under the PLRA.86  The Sixth Circuit has also applied the McGann 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 30. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  Recently, one court in the Ninth Circuit has gone so far as to require full 
payment immediately upon a prisoner’s release without creating any kind of 
specialized schedule.  See Murphy v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, No. 05-2553, 
2005 WL 3273573, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2005) (holding that the plaintiff could not 
avail himself of the partial payment provisions of § 1915(b)(1)–(2) upon release and 
therefore had to pay the filing fee in full within thirty days). 
 84. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
mandatory payment provisions of § 1915(b) . . . do not apply to a released 
prisoner.”). 
 85. See McGann, 96 F.3d at 29–30 (reasoning that if a prisoner were to have 
continuing payment obligations upon release, he would be obligated to pay the 
balance of the fees in full at that time because his prison account would be closed, 
thus cutting off the source provided in the PLRA for collection of the installment 
payments).   
 86. See Lewis v. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 07-3012, 2007 WL 2123753, at *1 (D. Neb. 
July 20, 2007) (citing McGann, 96 F.3d at 30) (holding that the plaintiff, a released 
prisoner being held at a mental hospital at the time of trial, was not required to pay 
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ruling, finding that it provides an efficient resolution of the 
procedural issues created by § 1915(b)(1)–(2).87  
While still recognizing a released prisoner’s eligibility for 
traditional IFP status, the Fourth Circuit retreated from McGann’s 
broad holding in DeBlasio v. Gilmore.88  Upon receiving DeBlasio’s IFP 
application, the district court required him to pay the full filing fee in 
installments from funds in his commissary account pursuant to the 
PLRA.89  The court directed DeBlasio to pay $11.37 as the initial 
portion of his filing fee, and he forwarded $12 to the court clerk soon 
after.90  Two months later, when the court learned of DeBlasio’s 
release from prison, it directed him to pay the rest of the filing fee 
within thirty days.91  DeBlasio sought traditional IFP status under  
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), pleading that he had insufficient assets to pay 
the remaining balance; however, the district court dismissed the 
action without considering his application.92  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal, holding that 
a prisoner who has no outstanding debts under the PLRA’s 
installment plan and who is released before paying the entire filing 
fee does not have to pay the remaining balance; rather, the litigant 
should apply for a waiver under § 1915(a)(1).93  Because DeBlasio 
had paid the requisite initial partial filing fee and was released from 
prison before any subsequent payment obligations under the 
installment plan came due, he could apply for traditional IFP 
assistance.94  According to the court, “[a] released prisoner should 
not have to shoulder a more difficult financial burden than the 
                                                          
the unpaid balance of the filing fee for his case).  But see Williams v. Doe #1,  
No. 06-1344, 2006 WL 3804027, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2006) (citing In re Smith, 
114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (holding that § 1915(b)(1) continues to apply 
after a prisoner’s release).   
 87. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612–13 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(recounting the Second Circuit’s analysis in McGann and deciding to adopt its same 
solution for assessing fees against a released prisoner), abrogated on other grounds by 
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); Taylor v. Luttrell, No. 06-2533, 2008 WL 4065927, 
at *2–3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2008) (granting the plaintiff IFP status under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(a)(1) and waiving the $350 filing fee without inquiring into whether the 
plaintiff had funds available to pay the initial partial fee between the filing of the 
complaint in August 2006 and his subsequent release).  
 88. 315 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 89. Id. at 397. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 399 (“While preventing frivolous lawsuits is a legitimate reason for 
requiring prisoners to overcome additional financial hurdles when filing suits, the 
same rationale does not dictate that recently-released prisoners become instantly 
liable for the remaining filing fee balance simply because they have been released.”). 
 94. See id. 
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average indigent plaintiff in order to continue his lawsuit.”95   
The Fourth Circuit limited its holding to prisoners who make all 
required installment payments while incarcerated, thereby deviating 
from the McGann court’s more generous waiver procedure.96 
B. The Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits Have Authorized  
§ 1915(b)(1)’s Application to Released Prisoners 
Focusing on the PLRA’s purpose in deterring frivolous inmate 
filings, the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have interpreted  
§ 1915(b) as imposing a continuing obligation on released prisoners 
to satisfy the full filing fee.  In Gay v. Texas Department of Corrections 
State Jail Division,97 for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a prisoner-
plaintiff released during the pendency of his action must still fulfill 
the PLRA’s filing fee requirements.98  After appealing a lower court 
decision dismissing his pro se civil rights complaint, Gay filed a 
motion to proceed under § 1915(a)(1), a supporting affidavit, and a 
statement of account in which he alerted the court to his release from 
prison and to his full-time enrollment at a community college.99   
The court concluded that the filing of a complaint or appeal triggers 
the PLRA’s fee obligations because the plain language of  
§ 1915(b)(1) requires a “prisoner” who “brings a civil action or files 
an appeal” to “pay the full amount of the filing fee.”100  The court 
reasoned that “to bring” means “to file”—in other words, 
notwithstanding his subsequent release, Gay still qualified as a 
“prisoner” who had filed an appeal while incarcerated.101  Based on 
that conclusion and its desire “to put some teeth into” § 1915(b)’s 
deterrent effect, the court remanded the case to the district court for 
an assessment and collection of fees.102 
The court also directly addressed the McGann decision and stated 
that it found “no support in the plain language of the PLRA” to 
justify the Second Circuit’s construction of the filing fee provision.103  
The Fifth Circuit focused on § 1915(b)(1)’s mandate that one who 
                                                          
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 398 (indicating that the trial court must fully review the litigant’s 
financial data when considering his eligibility for an IFP waiver, including his 
performance under the installment plan). 
 97. 117 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 98. Id. at 241.   
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 242. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 242 n.3 (remarking that the PLRA contains no provision instructing 
courts to forgive a prisoner’s debt under the installment plan upon his release from 
confinement).   
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chooses to sue or appeal while incarcerated be held responsible for 
the payment of the entire filing fee and dismissed the payment 
formula outlined in § 1915(b)(2) as “one means of payment.”104  
Importantly, the court did not suggest any other means to assess fees 
against an ex-prisoner nor did it indicate whether it would demand 
lump sum payments.  In addition, the court made no indication that 
it would consider a prisoner’s prior compliance with the installment 
plan when assessing fees, and lower courts have not done so.105  
The D.C. and Seventh Circuits adopted the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning in part, explicitly holding that a prisoner’s obligation to 
pay the full filing fee arises at the time of filing.106  However, they 
provided expanded analyses of the issue and considered the 
relevance of a prisoner’s payment record while in custody.  In In re 
Smith,107 for example, the plaintiff had no income or assets when he 
filed a petition against the United States Department of Justice and 
the United States Parole Commission shortly before his release from 
prison.108  The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by evaluating his 
compliance with the PLRA’s relevant provisions.109  The record 
revealed that he had failed to submit the prison account statements 
required by § 1915(a)(2), pay the initial partial filing fee required by 
§ 1915(b)(1), or make any of the monthly payments required by  
§ 1915(b)(2).110   
                                                          
 104. Id. (quoting McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30–31 (2d Cir. 
1996) (Miner, J., dissenting)). 
 105. See, e.g., Hunt v. Brannon, No. 06-00227, 2008 WL 553218, at *1 (S.D. Ala. 
Feb. 22, 2008) (obligating the released prisoner-plaintiff to pay the entire $350 filing 
fee without requesting or examining his commissary account records); Stone v. 
Ferrell, No. 05-0062, 2007 WL 4589748, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 28, 2007) (ordering the 
released prisoner-plaintiff to pay a balance of $147 without requesting or examining 
his commissary account records). 
 106. See In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Because Smith was a 
prisoner when he filed his petition, he is obligated to fulfill the applicable PLRA 
procedural requirements and pay the amounts due under the statute, 
notwithstanding the fact of his release.”); Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 898  
(7th Cir. 1997) (differentiating between the plaintiff’s status as a prisoner at the time 
of filing and his status as a non-prisoner at the time of trial).  
 107. 114 F.3d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 108. Id. at 1249.  In his petition, Smith contended (1) that the Commission’s files 
erroneously failed to reflect that the Commission ceased to have authority over him 
on November 1, 1992; (2) that the Commission’s calculation of his parole date 
violated § 235(b) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473,  
98 Stat. 1988 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2006)); (3) that the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons ignored its own rules in calculating the length of his sentence;  
(4) that the search of his residence violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and  
(5) that his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective.  Id.  
 109. Id. at 1251. 
 110. Id. 
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In response, Smith contended that because § 1915(b)(1) and other 
PLRA provisions refer exclusively to “prisoners,” the statute’s 
requirements could not bind him upon release.111  Like the Fourth 
Circuit in DeBlasio, however, the court held that Smith’s current 
inability to pay the applicable filing fee did not relieve him of his 
obligation to comply with past due procedural and payment 
obligations under the PLRA.112  According to the court, failure to 
comply with any of these requirements results in dismissal.113   
The court ultimately deferred any decision regarding Smith’s petition 
until he complied with the PLRA filing fee requirements.114   
By limiting its holding to the facts of Smith’s case, the court left 
unanswered the question of whether a prisoner who did meet his 
PLRA obligations while in prison should have to continue to make 
payments toward the filing fee after release. 
The Seventh Circuit used a slightly different analysis in 
determining a released prisoner’s continuing obligations under the 
PLRA.  In Robbins v. Switzer,115 the plaintiff initiated his lawsuit under 
the PLRA’s installment plan but was subsequently released from 
prison.116  He did not comply with the court’s orders requiring him to 
provide a prison trust account statement or an affidavit showing his 
current resources and income pursuant to § 1915(a)(2).117  Without 
the account statement, the court could not determine whether 
Robbins owed any fees under the statutory formula.118  Therefore, the 
court granted him twenty-one days to supply copies of the statement 
so that it could determine the balance at the time he filed his notices 
of appeal in addition to his income for the preceding six months.119  
Nevertheless, the court stated that an indigent former inmate was 
obliged to pay those portions of the filing fee that he should have 
remitted before his release, based on the balances in his prison trust 
account at the time he filed the complaint or notice of appeal.120   
                                                          
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1251–52. 
 113. Id. at 1252 (remarking that prisoners cannot “evade the statute by 
withholding required payments and win permanent reprieve from their obligations 
by pleading poverty upon release”).   
 114. Id. (finding it appropriate to afford Smith time to comply with the filing fee 
requirements because the circuit had not previously addressed the issue of the 
PLRA’s applicability to a released petitioner). 
 115. 104 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 116. Id. at 896. 
 117. Id. at 898. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 898–99. 
 120. Id.  The court further reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4), another section 
of the PLRA known as the “safety-valve” provision, could enable released prisoners 
who lack the necessary funds to pay the full filing fee to continue to litigate their 
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III. PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE PLRA’S PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Section 1915(b)(1)–(2) offers no solution to the procedural 
problems its language creates, necessitating an examination of the 
PLRA’s legislative history.121  This history demonstrates that released 
prisoners with no outstanding payments under the installment plan 
can receive more lenient IFP treatment without offending the 
purpose of the statute.122  Because Congress intended for the payment 
requirement to counteract the advantages prisoners receive 
throughout the litigation process, released prisoners can remain eligible 
for traditional IFP status. 
                                                          
case.  See id. at 898 (asserting that § 1915(b)(4) excuses “destitute” former prisoners 
from further payment under the statutory formula).  However, § 1915(b)(4) merely 
states that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action 
or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no 
assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”  28 U.S.C.  
§ 1915(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).  This section does not exonerate the plaintiff 
from payment; it temporarily excuses only the initial partial sum required by  
§ 1915(b)(1) at the time of filing.  See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 435  
(7th Cir. 1997) (confirming that § 1915(b)(4) applies only to the initial partial filing 
fee), abrogated on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).  
Section 1915(b)(4) would not help a former prisoner who managed to satisfy the 
initial partial fee but could not afford to make subsequent payments.   
 121. The Supreme Court has established that legislative interpretation must begin 
with an assessment of the plain language of the statutory provision at issue.  See, e.g., 
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (“Our task is to give effect to the will 
of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that 
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 
U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (instructing that the plain meaning is conclusive “except in the 
‘rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters’” (quoting Griffin, 458 U.S. at 
571)).  However, when Congress’s intent cannot be determined from the plain 
wording of a statute, the Court has resorted to legislative history.  See United States v. 
Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 154–55 (1932) (“In aid of the process of construction 
we are at liberty, if the meaning be uncertain, to have recourse to the legislative 
history of the measure and the statements by those in charge of it during its 
consideration by the Congress.”).  While some commentators and judges oppose 
reliance on legislative history, others recognize its value in construing statutes.   
See Stephen G. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (suggesting the value of legislative history in understanding a 
statute’s “relevant context, conventions, and purpose”); John F. Manning,  
The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2003) (endorsing the use of 
legislative history in light of the fact that “Congress does not always accurately reduce 
its intentions to words” and because “legislators necessarily draft statutes within the 
constraints of bounded foresight, limited resources, and imperfect language”).   
 122. See infra Part IV (explaining that compliant ex-prisoners pose a lesser burden 
on the judiciary because their willingness to make the installment payments indicates 
their respect for the system). 
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A. No Alternative Reading Can Reconcile the Inconsistency  
in the PLRA’s Payment Formula 
Congress likely intended for courts to interpret the terms 
“prisoner” and “bring” in § 1915(b)(1) according to their plain 
meanings.  Section 1915(b)(1) begins with the sentence:  “[I]f a 
prisoner brings a civil action . . . the prisoner shall be required to pay 
the full amount of a filing fee.”123  Inmates released after filing a 
complaint or appeal have contended that the PLRA’s obligations do 
not apply to them because the Act refers exclusively to “prisoners” 
who “bring” civil actions, suggesting that the payment obligations 
instituted by § 1915(b)(1) only apply to litigants who remain 
incarcerated for the duration of their lawsuits.124  The statute itself 
precludes alternative interpretations of the term “prisoner,” expressly 
defining it as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is 
accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent 
for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, 
probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”125  
In addition, based on its dictionary definition and relevant case 
authority, “bring” as used in § 1915(b)(1) means to file an action in 
court, not to see it through to a final disposition.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary provides that to “bring an action” means to institute legal 
proceedings.126  Moreover, in Hoffman v. Blaski,127 the Supreme Court 
interpreted the term’s meaning in the context of the federal venue 
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).128  The venue statute permits the 
transfer of “any civil action to any other district or division where it 
might have been brought.”129  The petitioner in Hoffman argued that 
the words “where it might have been brought” related not only to the 
filing of the action, but also to the time of the transfer.130   
The Supreme Court rejected that position because the statutory 
language was “unambiguous, direct, [and] clear” and interpreting 
“might have been brought” to refer to anything other than the time 
the lawsuit was filed would “do violence to the plain words of  
[the statute].”131   
                                                          
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 124. See, e.g., In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referencing the 
petitioner’s argument that the PLRA’s elaborate payment scheme applies only to 
prisoners). 
 125. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) (emphasis added). 
 126. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (8th ed. 2004). 
 127. 363 U.S. 335 (1960). 
 128. Id. at 335. 
 129. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). 
 130. 363 U.S. at 342. 
 131. Id. at 343–44. 
 2009] OUT OF JAIL . . . BUT STILL NOT FREE TO LITIGATE?   1555 
The Eleventh Circuit examined the term’s significance in a divided 
en banc opinion addressing the application of the PLRA’s 
controversial physical injury requirement132 to plaintiffs released from 
custody before the completion of their lawsuit.  In Harris v. Garner,133 
a six-judge majority held that § 1997e(e) applies to suits filed while a 
plaintiff is in prison but decided after his release.134  The majority 
reasoned that the statute’s use of the term “brought” refers to the 
filing or commencement of a lawsuit, not to its continuation, and 
rejected the argument that the statute no longer applies to a 
complaint once a plaintiff sheds prisoner status.135  The court based 
its interpretation on the premise that “Congress knows the settled 
legal definition of the words it uses, and uses them in the settled 
[legal] sense.”136   
Despite the fixed language of § 1915(b)(1), Congress 
simultaneously created a detailed payment formula in § 1915(b)(2) 
based on periodic withdrawals from a plaintiff’s commissary account 
and articulated no alternative collection method.137  Therefore, while 
§ 1915(b)(1) requires that its application depend on the 
confinement status of the plaintiff at the time of commencing the 
lawsuit or appeal, the language of § 1915(b)(2) provides no express 
instructions on its application to released prisoners and calls for a 
consideration of the PLRA’s legislative history.138  
                                                          
 132. The PLRA’s physical injury provision requires that prisoners suffer a physical 
injury in order to recover for mental or emotional injuries caused by their subjection 
to cruel and unusual punishment or other illegal conduct.  See 42 U.S.C § 1997e(e) 
(2006) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in 
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”).   
 133. 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 134. Id. at 985.   
 135. See id. at 974 (drawing on court interpretations of the term in other statutes 
and within the PLRA to support the premise that “brought” refers to the filing of a 
suit).  But see id. at 986 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(reasoning that § 1997e(e) should not apply to a pending complaint after a 
prisoner’s release because requiring the newly freed plaintiff and defendant(s) to 
start afresh in the litigation process would needlessly strain judicial resources while 
failing to further the PLRA’s goals of reducing filings). 
 136. Id. at 974 (citing Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159 
(1993)). 
 137. See McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 29–30 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“[N]ow that [the plaintiff] is no longer a prisoner, there is no prison account from 
which to calculate and debit the required payments.  Thus, a literal reading of all 
provisions of the PLRA, as applied to released prisoners, is not possible.”).  
 138. See supra note 121 (discussing appropriate uses of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation). 
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B. IFP Status for Released, Compliant Prisoners Comports with  
the Purpose and Legislative History of the PLRA 
While allowing prisoners to evade their payment obligations before 
release certainly offends the purpose of the PLRA, allowing 
compliant ex-prisoners to seek and receive traditional IFP status after 
release does not.  An examination of the PLRA’s legislative history 
reveals that deciding an indigent ex-prisoner’s obligation to pay more 
money towards the filing fee on the basis of his pre-release 
compliance with the installment plan, as opposed to the time of 
filing, still fulfills the statute’s goals.139 
1. Courts must hold prisoners accountable for the debts that they incur  
before release 
As the courts in Gay and In re Smith noted, Congress amended the 
IFP statute in an effort to alleviate the burden of frivolous inmate 
complaints on the federal courts and to encourage a sense of 
financial responsibility in prisoners.140  Indeed, proponents 
introduced the PLRA “to address the alarming explosion in the 
number of frivolous lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners.”141  
Facing little opposition, they secured the statute’s passage after 
minimal debate.142  
                                                          
 139. See infra Part III.B.1 (contending that examining a litigant’s pre-release 
compliance with the PLRA still effectuates Congress’s desire to instill a sense of 
financial responsibility in prisoners). 
 140. See, e.g., Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. State Jail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 241  
(5th Cir. 1997) (proposing that Congress wanted the revised IFP procedure to serve 
as a deterrent because “too many prisoners were filing too many frivolous or 
repetitive lawsuits”); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Congress 
‘endeavored to reduce frivolous prisoner litigation by making all prisoners seeking to 
bring lawsuits or appeals feel the deterrent effect created by liability for filing fees.’” 
(internal brackets omitted) (quoting Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 185  
(2d Cir. 1996))); see also SAVE:  COALITION TO STOP ABUSE AND VIOLENCE EVERYWHERE, 
PROTECT VICTIMS OF RAPE AND OTHER ABUSES:  REFORM THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM 
ACT (PLRA) 5, http://www.savecoalition.org/pdfs/save_final_report.pdf (last visited 
July 29, 2009) (“The theory behind this provision was to make prisoners ‘stop and 
think’ before filing cases that might not be meritorious.”).  
 141. 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); see also id. at 26,553 
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (urging passage to “bring relief to a civil justice system 
overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits”).  The PLRA’s legislative history consists 
mostly of legislators’ comments found in the Congressional Record and the 
testimony of witnesses produced during hearings in the Senate and House of 
Representatives.  See Branham, supra note 49, at 487 n.12 (discussing the availability 
of the PLRA’s legislative history).  
 142. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[I]t is 
worth noting that some believe that this legislation which has a far-reaching effect on 
prison conditions and prisoners’ rights deserved to have been the subject of 
significant debate.  It was not.”); 142 CONG. REC. 5,193 (1996) (statement of  
Sen. Kennedy) (“The PLRA was the subject of a single hearing in the Judiciary 
Committee, hardly the type of thorough review that a measure of this scope 
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The increase in inmate filings referenced by the PLRA’s 
proponents came as a result of the gradual turnaround in judicial 
treatment of prisoner-plaintiffs identified in Part I.A.143  Over time, 
these decisions, in combination with the passage of the CRIPA, gave 
way to an upsurge in prisoner litigation.144  Between the early 1980s 
and the late 1990s, prisoner petitions rose from 23,230 to 68,235, an 
increase of nearly 300%.145  In addition to the increase in claims, 
empirical and anecdotal evidence indicated that many claims were 
meritless or frivolous.146  This perceived onslaught in prisoner 
litigation drew heavy criticism from “correctional officials . . ., 
conservatives who opposed federal intervention in prison 
administration, and legislators who argued that judges should refrain 
                                                          
deserves.”).  But see Branham, supra note 49, at 538 (suggesting that Congress’s 
treatment of the PLRA was not “atypical”).   
 143. See CLEAR ET AL., supra note 17, at 102 (remarking that giving prisoners access 
to the courts to address their grievances politicized and “heightened prisoners’ 
consciousness”).  
 144. Id. 
 145. JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980–2000 1 (2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf.  In her comprehensive study on inmate litigation, 
Professor Margo Schlanger calculated that in 1995 inmates brought approximately 
40,000 federal civil lawsuits, which accounted for nearly one-fifth of the federal civil 
docket.  Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1558.  Schlanger made her calculations using 
statistics from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which records 
data on a fiscal year basis.  Id. at 1558 n.3. 
 146. See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (recounting 
prisoner lawsuits that concerned issues such as insufficient locker space; defective 
haircuts; invitations to a pizza party; and being served chunky instead of creamy 
peanut butter); PALMER, supra note 14, at 391 (“Whether true or not, stories were 
reported that prisons were nothing less than country clubs, where the prisoners 
enjoyed a standard of living surpassing many citizens in free society, with luxuries 
such as cable TV, catered food, and exercise facilities.”); Danielle M. McGill, Note, 
To Exhaust or Not to Exhaust?:  The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Requires Prisoners to 
Exhaust All Administrative Remedies Before Filing Excessive Force Claims in Federal Court,  
50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 129, 130 n.4 (2003) (providing further examples of outlandish 
prisoner claims); cf. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1594 (noting that between 1990 and 
1995, eighty percent or more of cases involving prisoner-plaintiffs ended in a pretrial 
judgment for the defendant).  Notably, commentators have advised that these 
statistics and anecdotes fail to take into account the concomitant rise in the number 
of prisoners as well as the reality that inmates are more likely to have their trials 
dismissed for non-substantive reasons such as failure to pay a filing fee or to make a 
timely response to a court request.  See Lyon v. Krol, 127 F.3d 763, 766 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1997) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (“A list of reasons for any increase in the number of 
complaints . . . would likely include the high incidence of prison overcrowding, a 
lack of carefully trained correctional officers, and inadequate and frequently unfair 
internal grievance procedures.”); Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1568 (charging that the 
critics of inmate litigation “used stylized anecdotes and gerrymandered statistics” to 
push the litigation-reform effort); Greg Moran, Cruel and Unusual:  Where Does 
Punishment End and Cruelty Begin?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 9, 1996, at A1 
(“The high dismissal rate of prisoner lawsuits . . . is not solely due to frivolous filings, 
but to potentially valid claims that are thrown out for minute procedural or technical 
reasons.”). 
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from making public policy.”147  The PLRA instituted major procedural 
barriers to the filing of prisoner lawsuits to stem this rise in cases.148   
In light of this history, the McGann court and its followers in the 
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have frustrated congressional intent by 
failing to examine a released prisoner’s payment records and pre-
release compliance.  Congress designed the statute’s filing fee 
provisions to reduce frivolous prisoner litigation “by making all 
prisoners seeking to bring lawsuits or appeals feel the deterrent effect 
created by liability for filing fees.”149  Congress believed that the lack 
of economic disincentives to filing meritless cases had contributed to 
the proliferation of prisoner litigation.150  Without addressing the 
issue of prior compliance, the Second Circuit focused its analysis 
exclusively on the potential effects of requiring ongoing payment.151  
Excusing a released prisoner’s failure to comply with the installment 
plan while still incarcerated encourages all prisoners nearing 
completion of their sentences to eschew the payment process.152   
As the court in Robbins v. Switzer noted, “[t]he Act’s effectiveness 
would be eroded if, during their final year of custody, prisoners could 
file suits and appeals without considering the financial consequences, 
planning to ignore the statute while in custody, divert trust account 
funds to other purposes, and plead poverty upon release.”153  
Therefore, allowing inmates who never authorized prison 
administrators to submit the requisite monthly payments on their 
                                                          
 147. See CLEAR ET AL., supra note 17, at 102 (commenting that these groups pushed 
for legislation that would both curb prisoner filings and minimize judicial micro-
management of state and federal prisons). 
 148. The PLRA contains ten sections that amended several different provisions of 
the United States Code.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2006) (requiring district 
courts to weed out prisoner claims that clearly lack merit); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) 
(restricting attorneys’ fees); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (prohibiting claims for emotional 
injury without a prior showing of physical injury).  Recent empirical evidence 
confirms the statute’s effectiveness in reducing prisoner filings.  See Roosevelt,  
supra note 50, at 1779 (“[T]o the extent that success can be measured by the volume 
of suits, the PLRA has worked.”). 
 149. In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Leonard v. Lacy, 
88 F.3d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 150. See Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Congress deemed 
prisoners to be pestiferous litigants because they have so much free time on their 
hands and there are few costs to filing suit.”); 141 CONG. REC. 14,572 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (reasoning that the new filing fee requirement “will force 
prisoners to think twice about the case and not just file reflexively”). 
 151. See McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(voicing concern that imposing continuing payment obligations on released 
prisoners would lead to an “onerous” result because it might require them to pay the 
balance of the filing fee in one large installment).   
 152. See id. at 31 (Miner, J., dissenting) (“[I]t just makes no sense to me to allow a 
prisoner to take the balance in his prison account with him upon his release . . . .”). 
 153. 104 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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behalf to nonetheless continue their case in federal court upon 
release conflicts with the legislature’s expressed desire to infuse a 
sense of accountability in prisoners. 
2. Granting traditional IFP status to compliant ex-prisoners supports the 
PLRA’s goals 
Although the legislative history of the PLRA does not contain any 
specific comment on its applicability to released prisoners, it plainly 
discloses that Congress sought to distinguish incarcerated from non-
incarcerated litigants because the former encounter fewer obstacles 
throughout the litigation process.154  Congress did not intend for the 
PLRA to inhibit the right of access of indigents not cared for by the 
state,155 a category that includes released prisoners. 
While in custody, prisoners depend on the government for their 
means of subsistence.156  As Senator Jon Kyl noted in his floor 
statement: 
Unlike other prospective litigants who seek poor person status, 
prisoners have all the necessities of life supplied, including the 
materials required to bring their lawsuits.  For a prisoner who 
qualifies for poor person status, there is no cost to bring a suit and, 
therefore, no incentive to limit suits to cases that have some chance 
of success.157 
Kyl further observed that because inmates have their basic material 
needs provided at state expense, and because they are further 
provided with free paper, postage, and legal assistance, “[f]iling 
frivolous . . . lawsuits has become a recreational activity for long-term 
                                                          
 154. See Witzke v. Femal, 376 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the 
PLRA targets current as opposed to former prisoners because they “encounter a 
uniquely low opportunity cost relative to the typical litigant”). 
 155. See supra Part I.C (establishing that the PLRA did not alter the IFP procedure 
for non-incarcerated indigent litigants). 
 156. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1285 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the 
government provides prisoners with the “essentials of life” (quoting Evans v. Croom, 
650 F.2d 521, 523 (4th Cir. 1981))).  In evaluating prisoners’ unique relationship 
with the government, the Supreme Court has noted: 
For state prisoners, eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working, and playing 
are all done under the watchful eye of the State . . . . What for a private 
citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his 
tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a 
dispute with the State. 
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).  Consequently, prisoners have 
gradually garnered a reputation as frequent, frivolous filers.  See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 
474 U.S. 193, 211 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“With less to profitably occupy 
their time than potential litigants on the outside, and with a justified feeling that they 
have much to gain and virtually nothing to lose, prisoners appear to be far more 
prolific litigants than other groups in the population.”). 
 157. 141 CONG. REC. 14,572–73 (1995). 
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residents of our prisons.”158  In addition, as many commentators have 
noted, prisoners have greater incentives to file frivolous lawsuits.159  
Based on these realities and the statistical evidence discussed above, 
Congress concluded that inmate abuse of the federal judicial system 
was likely to continue absent significant changes to the IFP statute.160  
While proponents of the PLRA did not want to prevent inmates 
from bringing meritorious suits,161 they were concerned that prisoners 
put an especially heavy burden on courts’ civil dockets while 
incurring few opportunity costs.162  For example, Senator Harry Reid 
opined that the judicial system allowed prisoners to maintain 
frivolous litigation with the state and provided them not only “an up-
to-date library and a legal assistant,” but also “three square meals a 
day” and the ability to “watch cable TV in the rec room or lift weights 
in a nice modern gym” if they “get tired of legal research.”163  Senator 
Orrin Hatch commented that “[j]ailhouse lawyers with little else to 
do are tying our courts in knots with an endless flood of frivolous 
litigation.”164   
Inmates can litigate in the first place because, in addition to 
providing food, medical care, and shelter, prisons also supply them 
with various legal resources in accordance with the landmark Bounds 
                                                          
 158. Id. at 14,572. 
 159. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 (1972) (stating that prisoners have unique 
incentives to file meritless or frivolous lawsuits because they can obtain a “short 
sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse”); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[A] courtroom is certainly a more hospitable place to 
spend an afternoon than a prison cell.”). 
 160. See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (lamenting that 
frivolous prisoner lawsuits “waste valuable legal resources” and characterizing the 
PLRA as a necessary measure to curtail massive abuse of the judicial process); 
Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1567–68 (commenting that the PLRA’s supporters viewed 
inmate litigation as “a wasteful system demanding drastic amendment, even  
all-but-complete elimination”).   
 161. See 142 CONG. REC. 5,118 (1996) (statement of Sen. Reid) (“If somebody has a 
good case, a prisoner, let him file it.”); 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch) (“I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims.   
This legislation will not prevent those claims from being raised.”).  But see Winslow,  
supra note 14, at 1666–67 (“Absent from the vociferous dialogue regarding frivolous 
and meritless prisoner lawsuits was any significant discussion about meritorious 
prisoner suits and the constitutional protections afforded to prisoners.”).  
Meritorious prisoner claims tend to address issues such as inadequate medical 
treatment, overcrowding, unsanitary and dilapidated facilities, lack of physical 
security, and administrative transfer or segregation without due process.  See Roger 
Roots, Of Prisoners and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers:  A Tale of Two Litigation Reform Efforts,  
38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 210, 221–22 (2002) (discussing examples of successful civil 
rights suits brought by pro se inmate-litigants). 
 162. 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (urging passage to 
“bring relief to a civil justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits”). 
 163. Id. at 27,043. 
 164. Id. at 26,553. 
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v. Smith decision.165  Common methods of attempting to provide 
inmates with meaningful court access include establishing and 
maintaining an up-to-date law library,166 employing assistants in the 
library167 and persons trained in the law,168 and providing supplies.169  
Moreover, as a result of Johnson v. Avery, incarcerated litigants can 
receive assistance from other inmates.170  These materials effectuate a 
prisoner’s right of access not just at the time of filing, but from 
commencement of the suit until its conclusion.171   
Prisoners released during the pendency of their suit lose access to 
the resources once available to them in the prison facility and 
immediately begin to face the same costs of prosecuting their action 
as non-prisoners.172  To litigate in federal court, indigent non-prisoners 
can secure IFP status without enduring the complicated installment 
plan,173 and indigent prisoners in the custody of the state generally do 
                                                          
 165. See 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (instructing that the state can discharge its 
obligation either by providing an adequate library or by providing inmates with 
access to attorneys or other persons trained in the law to assist them). 
 166. Library necessities include relevant state and federal statutes and federal law 
reporters.  See, e.g., Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1250–52 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(requiring state law materials); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 720 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(requiring Federal Supplements); see also Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678, 684  
(E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d, 591 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring current volumes of 
United States Reports and current copies of the state criminal code). 
 167. See, e.g., Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F. Supp. 1309, 1318–19 (D. Ariz. 1988),  
aff’d, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991) (ordering direct assistance for a prisoner whose 
minimal knowledge of the English language prevented him from properly preparing 
his claims). 
 168. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 831 (“Among the alternatives are the training of 
inmates as paralegal assistants to work under lawyers’ supervision, the use of 
paraprofessionals and law students, either as volunteers or in formal clinical 
programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys through bar associations or other 
groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, and the use of full-time 
staff attorneys . . . .”). 
 169. Gluth, 773 F. Supp. at 1321 (reasoning that writing instruments effectuate 
meaningful access by helping prisoners prepare and deliver acceptable court 
papers). 
 170. Courts have struck down rules that unreasonably interfere with the essential 
work of jailhouse lawyers.  See, e.g., In re Harrell, 470 P.2d 640, 647 (Cal. 1970) 
(invalidating a rule that prevented a jailhouse lawyer from keeping a client’s legal 
papers in his cell). 
 171. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 810 (9th Cir. 1991) (Wiggins, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (“[W]ithout legal assistance or library access at all stages 
of a proceeding, an inmate’s right of access to the courts is not effective or 
meaningful.”); Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
meaningful access includes access to legal resources for post-filing needs). 
 172. See Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that an 
indigent’s release from prison triggers an immediate rise in litigating costs because 
the state no longer provides for him).  See generally JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS 
COME HOME:  PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 112–25 (2003) (describing the 
employment and financial difficulties prisoners encounter upon their release from 
prison). 
 173. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006) (bestowing discretion on federal courts to 
authorize IFP status for non-prisoner litigants). 
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not have to “make the choice between [their] lawsuit[s] and the 
necessities of life in the same manner that a non-prisoner would.”174  
Indigent ex-prisoners—no longer benefitting from free legal resources 
and having to provide for themselves—again need the assistance of 
traditional IFP status to maintain court access. 
IV. A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF § 1915 TO RELEASED PRISONERS 
Because the installment pay plan contemplates a mechanism at the 
prison for collecting a part of the filing fee and remitting it to the 
court,175 its requirements and safeguards cannot apply equally to 
released prisoners.176  Courts have consistently upheld the PLRA’s 
amendments to the federal IFP statute—as applied to incarcerated 
litigants—against various constitutional challenges.177  According to 
these decisions, the filing fee requirements placed on prisoners 
under § 1915(b) “do not deprive them of adequate, effective, and 
meaningful [court] access.”178  Although the new provisions make IFP 
proceedings more onerous for prisoners than for other classes of 
indigent plaintiffs, Congress can impose such conditions without 
violating the Constitution.179  
                                                          
 174. Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) (2006) (“The agency having custody of the 
prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court 
. . . .”). 
 176. See supra Part III.A (establishing the deficiencies in the plain language of  
§ 1915(b)(1)–(2)). 
 177. Courts have reasoned that the PLRA’s fee requirements do not violate 
prisoners’ First Amendment right to engage in the expressive conduct of litigation, 
as a prisoner who complies with the periodic payment schedule still has access to the 
federal court system.  See, e.g., Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286  
(6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that Congress’s refusal to subsidize a prisoner’s exercise 
of his First Amendment rights does not constitute a violation of those rights).   
Courts have also held that § 1915(b) satisfies equal protection standards.  See Tucker 
v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1300–01 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reasoning that Congress’s 
legitimate interest in curbing meritless litigation provides a rational basis for treating 
prisoners and non-prisoners dissimilarly); Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1286–87 (refusing to 
apply strict scrutiny because prisoners are not a suspect class and finding that the 
filing fee requirement rationally relates to legitimate governmental interests in 
curtailing frivolous tort and civil rights litigation).  These same courts have further 
concluded that liability for the full filing fee does not deny prisoners either 
procedural or substantive due process.  See Tucker, 142 F.3d at 1299 (holding that 
periodic payments do not constitute an “insurmountable barrier” to litigating a case 
and therefore do not violate any right, privilege, or immunity safeguarded by the 
Constitution or federal statute); Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1287–88 (finding that the 
statute satisfies the constitutional requirements of procedural due process because 
although prisoners have a protected property interest in their money, the filing fee 
requirement does not absolutely deprive them of their assets).  
 178. Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1284. 
 179. See Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 874 
(1997) (“[T]he right of access to federal courts is not a free-floating right, but rather 
is subject to Congress’ Article III power to set limits on federal jurisdiction.”). 
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In support of this conclusion, courts have reasoned that the PLRA 
affords prisoners certain procedural safeguards that mitigate the 
burden of the filing fee requirement.180  Under this rationale, the 
PLRA revisions of the IFP statute do not qualify as an absolute bar to 
court access because prisoners can apply to use the installment plan 
under § 1915(b), which allows them to pay the filing fee in smaller 
monthly sums and therefore constitutes a minimal financial 
burden.181  In Hampton v. Hobbs,182 for example, the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that although the prisoner had to pay an initial partial filing 
fee and monthly payments thereafter, other provisions of the statute 
tempered those requirements significantly.183  As examples, the court 
cited the sections allowing the initial fee to be collected only “when 
funds exist” and the monthly payments to be deducted only when the 
prisoner’s account balance exceeds ten dollars.184   
If courts required indigent prisoners to pay an unaffordable lump 
sum upon release to continue their lawsuit—a possibility that the 
McGann court feared and none of the opposing circuits have 
explicitly rejected—those prisoners would in effect be “denied a 
reasonable opportunity to petition the court because the fee, and 
therefore access, would be beyond their reach.”185  The rationales 
used in Hampton and similar cases do not hold merit if prisoners 
cannot apply for traditional IFP status upon release because, without 
an institutional account to facilitate payment, the litigant lacks the 
ten dollar and twenty percent safeguards of § 1915(b)(1)–(2).   
In order to maintain the constitutionality of § 1915(b) as applied 
to released prisoners while also preserving Congress’s goals in 
enacting the PLRA, all circuits should adopt the middle-ground 
approach used in cases like DeBlasio v. Gilmore.186  Thus, courts should 
assess a released prisoner’s trust account statements before dismissing 
                                                          
 180. See Tucker, 142 F.3d at 1298 (commenting that the PLRA never exacts more 
than twenty percent of an indigent prisoner’s assets or income); Lucien v. DeTella, 
141 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the PLRA authorizes only periodic 
collections from prisoners’ commissary accounts).  
 181. See 141 CONG. REC. 14,573 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“The filing fee is small 
enough not to deter a prisoner with a meritorious claim, yet large enough to deter 
frivolous claims and multiple filings.”). 
 182. 106 F.3d 1281 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 183. Id. at 1284. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Simone Schonenberger, Note, Access Denied:  The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
86 KY. L.J. 457, 465 (1997) (discussing the potential negative effect of one large fee 
payment on the ability of incarcerated litigants to maintain access to the courts). 
 186. See 315 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (evaluating a former prisoner’s qualification 
for in forma pauperis status before deciding whether he owed filing fees for a civil 
action commenced while he was in prison). 
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his action or appeal for failure to pay the full filing fee.187  If the court 
determines that the released prisoner had the financial means to pay 
any part of the PLRA fees, he must pay such amounts that, according 
to the prison account statements, he could have paid when he filed 
his petition in court and in subsequent installments; if he does not 
pay his outstanding debts, the court should dismiss his complaint for 
failure to comply with its order.188  If the prisoner demonstrates that, 
after filing the complaint or notice of appeal, he either (1) satisfied 
all of his installment payments or (2) lacked the assets to pay any 
portion of the filing fee, the court should allow him to apply for 
traditional IFP status and then proceed to address his petition.   
This solution furthers the PLRA’s goals of reducing frivolous suits 
in federal courts and improving their quality.189 If the prisoner abides 
by payment deadlines and forwards available funds, and then seeks to 
continue to litigate the case after release from prison, the likelihood 
that his claim is frivolous dissipates.190  In addition, many courts have 
limited the scope of § 1915(a)(1) so that, at most, it waives the filing 
fee and other court-imposed costs and requires the IFP litigant to 
personally finance other aspects of the litigation process such as 
depositions and transcripts.191  Thus, if former prisoners choose to 
continue litigating upon their release, they have engaged in the exact 
type of economic decision-making that Congress hoped to 
encourage.192 
Lastly, this formula strikes a proper balance between the 
government’s interest in deterring inmates from filing meritless suits 
and prisoners’ interests in having access to a forum in which they can 
vindicate their rights.  Under this scheme, an individual’s release 
from prison does not excuse his prior noncompliance with § 1915(b), 
but it also does not immediately trigger an absolute obligation to pay 
any outstanding balance of the filing fee.  Even though the prisoner 
                                                          
 187. See supra Part II.A (describing the procedure endorsed by the Fourth 
Circuit). 
 188. See Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing the 
need to examine a released inmate’s trust account to identify any outstanding debts). 
 189. See supra Part III.B (describing Congress’s objectives in enacting the PLRA). 
 190. See Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 1779 n.53 (suggesting that an inmate whose 
suit is frivolous “presumably has less at stake and will be less willing to pay a filing 
fee” as a condition of proceeding in federal court). 
 191. See cases cited supra note 45. 
 192. Courts could subject the ex-prisoner’s financial condition to continuous 
review during the remainder of the lawsuit and require him to pay—to the extent 
possible—all or part of the filing fee if he acquired a sufficient source of income.  
Before the PLRA, some courts revoked leave to proceed IFP if evidence indicated 
that the plaintiff’s economic situation had improved.  See Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 
191, 197 (10th Cir. 1996) (requiring the plaintiff to pay service and mileage costs 
after the court confirmed that he no longer qualified for pauper status). 
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can continue his lawsuit without further payment of fees, the court 
still holds him responsible for any installment payments that came 
due before release, thereby instilling a sense of financial 
responsibility. 
CONCLUSION 
Before the PLRA’s enactment, district courts retained broad 
discretion to grant or deny IFP petitions from incarcerated and non-
incarcerated litigants.193  The PLRA amendments have confined this 
discretion by mandating that courts assess and collect filing fees from 
prisoners bringing civil suits.194  Although the PLRA’s drafters hoped 
that these amendments would simplify the IFP procedure and reduce 
the workload of the federal judiciary, courts have expended time and 
resources to resolve § 1915’s ambiguities each time a prisoner seeks 
to continue a pending lawsuit upon release.195 
According to the most recent data available, 713,473 prisoners 
were released during 2006, an increase of 2.1% from the number 
released in 2005.196  The recent increase in the federal filing fee197 
amplifies the need for a uniform solution to the procedural issues 
presented by § 1915.  The higher the fee, the longer it will take for 
prisoners to complete the installment plan, making it more likely that 
they will be released before finishing payment.   
Deciding released prisoners’ continuing payment obligations 
according to their debts under the PLRA’s fee formula provides a 
straight-forward procedure for courts to follow and fulfills the 
statute’s purpose in deterring meritless lawsuits.  As the PLRA’s 
legislative history demonstrates, Congress sought to create a more 
demanding payment procedure for prisoners because of the unique 
advantages their living arrangement provides.  When a litigant leaves 
                                                          
 193. See, e.g., Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983) (commenting 
that a trial court could deny an application for leave to proceed IFP as long as it did 
not act arbitrarily or deny the petition on erroneous grounds). 
 194. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (2006) (requiring district courts to make a 
series of factual findings regarding the prisoner’s monthly account balances or 
deposits in the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint as a basis for 
collecting fees). 
 195. See Branham, supra note 49, at 543 (commenting that “courts [have been] 
confronted [with numerous questions] regarding the PLRA’s meaning [and] scope” 
even though the statute was “purportedly designed to curb the burdens of inmate 
litigation”).   
 196. WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007 4 (2008), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
pim07.pdf. 
 197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006) (increasing the federal filing fee from $250 to 
$350). 
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prison having satisfied all past due payment obligations, nothing 
differentiates him from the general population except his criminal 
record.  If he desires to continue his lawsuit, he poses no greater risk 
than any other non-incarcerated citizen who seeks a traditional IFP 
waiver.  Having met the PLRA’s deadlines, his status as an ex-prisoner 
should not determine his right of access; rather, his compliance with 
the statute should entitle him to apply for IFP assistance under  
§ 1915(a)(1). 
